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Abstract
Agents work for their own reputations when young but for their rmswhen old.
An individual with an established reputation cannot credibly commit to exerting e¤ort
when working alone. However, by hiring and working with juniors of uncertain rep-
utation, seniors will have incentives to exert e¤ort. Incentives for young agents arise
from a concern for their own reputation (and the opportunity to take over the rm)
but older agents work for the reputation of their rms (and the opportunity to sell out
to juniors). An important theoretical contribution is an example of a mechanism that
endogenously introduces type uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
In numerous applications, reputation concerns play an important role in ensuring e¤ort.
For example, in professional services industries, such as law and consulting, products cannot
be inspected prior to sale and it is impossible to make fully contingent descriptions of the
product.1 Developing and maintaining reputation both at the level of the rm and the
individual are crucial. Indeed, previous literature has suggested that the very existence of
a rm might arise as a means to manage reputation and that careers are designed to take
into account reputational considerations.2
We outline a framework in which a young agent is motivated by concerns for her own
reputations. However, once she is established, her own reputation is not at risk and cannot
act as a motivation. She, therefore, chooses to hire and work with a junior whose ability
is uncertain and, since only combined outcomes are observed, her actions will a¤ect the
reputation of her junior. She cares about the reputation of her junior since she controls
the client list that the junior needs. She is able to provide incentives for the junior by
committing in advance to a price at which she will allow the junior access to the client
list (or equivalently the wage which she will pay to the junior if she retains him). Thus,
in particular, young agents are motivated by concerns for their own reputations, and old,
successful agents are motivated by the reputations of the rms which they own (or more
specically by concern for the reputation of their employees).
This modeling approach and the results relate and contribute to a number of di¤erent
literatures.
First, there is a contribution to the literature on reputation. Any reputational concern
relies almost tautologically on current actions a¤ecting future beliefs.3 In particular, this
implies that there must be uncertainty for reputational concerns to arise since if beliefs
1 It is relatively di¢ cult for a consultant to show a client the report that she would write if hired or for
a client after the event to complain that he did not receive the report that he was expecting.
2For examples, see David M. Kreps (1990) on the rst point and Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy
(1992) on the second.
3An earlier literature, including for example Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Le­ er (1981) or more closely
related to this paper Jacques Cremer (1986) has been built on the notion that current actions can a¤ect
future continuation values not through beliefs on fundamentals but rather through coordinating on equi-
librium strategies along di¤erent subgames of innite games. Such repeated game notions are now seldom
referred to as reputation the term in the literature now reserved for type-based models. (The interested
reader is referred to the opening chapter of Heski Bar-Isaac (2004) for a discussion of notions of reputa-
tion.) Moreover, these repeated game models have been criticized on the grounds that the results rely on
an innite horizon and the equilibrium strategies, that the results rely on, are not renegotiation-proof. The
results described below are robust to both such criticisms.
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are sure then little can be done to change them.4 Loosely for an agent to be motivated
by reputation she needs to have something to prove. Previous literature has suggested
the possibility that this might lead principals to slow down the release of information to
sustain reputational concerns (Seonghoon Jeon (1996) for example) or the important role
that exogenous replenishment of type uncertainty might play (Bengt Holmstrom (1999),
Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) and the references therein).5 This is the rst paper,
however, to suggest an approach to strategically introduce new type uncertainty and allow
an agent, thereby, to credibly commit to exerting e¤ort.
Second, the focus on small teams departs from other reputation, which seeks to explore
the issue of the interaction of individual and collective reputations. Such papers have either
been unable to separate the notions of individual and collective reputations (Steven Tadelis
(2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001))6 or have assumed that groups are very large
4Much of the foundational literature on reputation has, in some sense, never allowed an agent an oppor-
tunity to establish herself or equivalently as time passes no uncertainty is resolved. In particular, consider
the pioneering work of Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson in a series of papers pub-
lished in 1982 and developed by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1989) and (1992). In these models
observers cannot distinguish a strategic type behaving well and a crazy type who behaves in a way in
which the strategic would like to be able to commit (Fudenberg and Levine (1989) therefore term this a
Stackelbergtype). That is, since the strategic type has an incentive to convince the public that she is a
Stackelberg type, in equilibrium there is uncertainty about an agent who behaves in the way that a Stack-
elberg type would behave, as this might be a strategic type mimicking. Thus the uncertainty necessary to
maintain reputational incentives arises naturally and is maintained over time.
Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (2004) show that even with such a Stackelberg
type if there is imperfect monitoring of actions, then in the very long run customers would learn an agents
true type and reputation e¤ects would disappear. They view their results:
as suggesting that a model of long-run reputations should incorporate some mechanism by
which the uncertainty about types is continually replenished.
An important contribution of this paper is to suggest an endogenous mechanism for achieving this.
5 In the organizational economics literature, papers that note that uncertainty might be helpful include
Margaret A. Meyer, Trond E. Olsen and Gaute Torsvik (1996), Meyer and John Vickers (1997) and Cremer
(1995). However, these papers are based on period-by-period output-contingent contracting and introduce
no means to introduce new type uncertainty.
6 Indeed, central to these papers is the idea that one cannot identify the current holder of a rms name.
It is further worth noting explicitly that this work and other literature based on name trading based on
name-trading (Tadelis (1999) and (2003)) relies heavily on the intertemporal non-observability of name
transfers. In contrast, this paper relies on the contemporaneous non-observability of joint production and
the focus is on the decision of the senior agents decision of whether or not to hire, rather than the junior
agents decision to join one rm rather than another or buy one name rather than another.
On this last aspect, in this paper it is assumed that the senior cannot screen juniors and that all juniors are
ex-ante identical, so that the question of who to hire does not arise. This latter question has been considered
elsewhere, in particular Björn Segendor¤ (2000) and Amihai Glazer and Segendor¤ (2001) consider how
reputational concerns might, for example, lead good seniors to hire bad juniors when the relationship
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(Jean Tirole (1996) and Jonathan Levin (2001)) so that a single individuals actions can
have no e¤ect on the collective reputation.7 In particular, this focus on small teams, admits
the possibility hitherto absent from the literature, that an agent might have concerns both
for her own and for her groups reputation.
With respect to the application of organizational design for professional services rms,
a number of other interesting features arise.8 In particular, it is shown that teamwork
can create rather than dampen incentives since mixed teams of partners and juniors can
provide incentives for partners.9 Moreover, in this framework for an up-or-out mechanism
to be e¤ective then promotion must be to partnershipan empirical feature which previous
literature has not much addressed, but which arises very naturally in the context of the
overlapping generations framework of the central model.10,11
between rewards and reputation are non-linear
7Michèle Breton, Pascal St-Amour and Désiré Vencatachellum (2002, 2003) and Axel Anderson and
Lones Smith (2002) also consider reputation in small groups but focus on what types of agents work
together. In these papers agents do not have any e¤ort decision to make and so these papers cannot
address reputational incentives to exert e¤ort the focus of this paper.
8See, for example Canice Prendergast (1999), for a review and further references on the broad question
of organizational design and incentives.
9Meyer, Olsen and Torsvik (1996) also show that teamworkprecisely because it clouds the inference that
can be drawn on a particular agentmight be preferred to solo production. However, in their model, this
is to dampen the ratchet e¤ect in a model of explicit outcome-contingent contracting with limited ability
to commit to long-term contracts. This is quite di¤erent to this papers model, in which agents are risk
neutral and it is not possible to write explicit contracts, and where reputational considerations rather than
explicit outcome-contingent contracts are the driving force behind e¤ort. Yeon-Koo Che and Seung-Weon
Yoo (2001) consider that agents within a team can monitor each others actions better than a principal and
over a long period dynamic strategies can allow team members to enforce good behavior.
10For an exception and elaboration on this criticism of previous literature, see James B. Rebitzer and
Lowell J. Taylor (2001) who focus on employees threatening to grab and leavewith an important client,
abstracting from other incentive problems, and suggest that the up-or-out system has evolved as a resolution
to this problem.
There are a number of interesting papers, relating to the phenomenon of up-or-out; most relevant to this
paper are Charles Kahn and Gur Huberman (1988) and Prendergast (1993).
11A similar feature arises in Alan D. Morrison and William J. Wilhelm Jr. who consider the role of
partnerships in ensuring that seniors mentor their juniors. In their paper a partner has an incentive to
mentor a junior as only a good junior who has been mentored would be willing to buy a partnership share
in the rm, as only in this case will the junior be able to maintain the rms collective reputation and
the value of her partnership stake. Thus the paper echoes a number of the themes highlighted here, in
particular, a senior is motivated to work since this a¤ects her ability to sell the rm to the junior. However,
the issue at the heart of Morrison and Wilhelm (2003) is the incentive for partners to mentor juniorsan
incentive which naturally leads seniors and juniors to work togetherand they consider no incentive issues
for the juniors. Here instead, seniors and juniors are identical and face similar decisionsit is not the case
that the senior a¤ects the productive capability of the junior, as in Morrison and Wilhelm (2003), but
rather can a¤ect how this is perceived; moreover we show that the promotion structure described can be
successful in providing incentives for the junior as well as for the senior. Further their model has no role
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Finally, whereas some have argued that law rm partnerships might exist to diversify
risks for individuals, in practice one sees groups of lawyers working in the same or related
elds. An established argument for this phenomenon is that it allows for mutual monitoring
among the partners in a law rm (Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972)), note
in addition that a more homogeneous rm makes it more di¢ cult for clients to identify
individual contributions of seniors and juniors and so enables the reputational mechanism
highlighted in this paper to operate and seniors to credibly commit to exerting e¤ort.
The central model is somewhat involved and so to gain intuition, a simpler model
is introduced which highlights a number of important features, in particular including the
central role of a joint production function. The central model itself makes a number of stark
assumptions, in many cases (as discussed below) these are made primarily for expositional
purposes and can be relaxed.12 The remaining, crucial assumptions and their empirical
plausibility are discussed in a section following the presentation of the central results. A
nal section concludes.
2 A motivating example
In this section, we introduce a simple model to demonstrate that a senior, an agent with
an established reputation, can exploit uncertainty about something else, when there is a
joint production process which does not allow individual contributions to be observed.
Specically, consider an agent, the senior, who lives for two periods. There are many
customers Bertrand competing for the good that the senior produces which may be of
high or low quality depending on her e¤ort decision, as discussed below, and for the good
produced by a machine of uncertain quality. Timing is as follows.
Period 0: There is a machine which either always produces high quality or always low
quality products, but can only produce one unit in each period and does so at no cost. The
machine owner together with the senior and customers believes that with probability  the
machine is the type that always produces high quality. Thus, supposing no discounting
between periods, a risk neutral machine owner who worked the machine independently
would have an expected present value of 2.
The senior can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the current owner.13 Thus she can
for individual reputations.
12For the skeptical reader, we prove similar results in a number of related models which relax many of
these assumptions have been relaxed. These results are available in the appendix.
13Note that the assumption of a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er on the part of the senior is not crucial, similar
qualitative results could be generated if the machine owner had the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it
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Figure 1: Timeline for example
o¤er 2 to buy the machine for the 2 periods, collecting the revenue for the machines
output.
Period 1: Customers Bertrand compete for the output produced by the senior and
the machine. They assign the value 1 to a high quality product and 0 to low quality and
compete to buy the unit so that the sale price is exactly the customersbelief that the
product will be successful, since sale occurs before the quality is realized and the price
cannot be made contingent on the outcome.
The senior decides whether or not to exert e¤ort at a cost c. If she exerts e¤ort, she
will produce a single unit which will be a high quality product with probability g  1 and
otherwise low quality. If she exerts no e¤ort then the product will be low quality for sure.
Quality is non-veriable and not observed prior to purchase so that the price cannot be
contingent on quality but will depend on customersexpectations.
Finally suppose that g > c so that the costly e¤ort is e¢ cient. In particular, if e¤ort
were contractible or the senior could credibly commit to it and be compensated for it, then
she would exert e¤ort.
Period 2: The quality of the goods produced in period 1 is observed. If the senior
bought and worked with the machine then the output cannot be directly attributed, that
is if a one high quality good and one low quality good are observed, customers do not know
which was produced by the senior and which by the machine. Again customers Bertrand
compete for the output produced.
This timing is summarized in Figure 3.1.
First suppose that the senior has no opportunity to buy and work with the machine,
o¤er or under any intermediate bargaining power assumption and bargaining game. The key point here is
that the total value to the senior from working with the machine is greater than the value of them working
separately, and that senior is the residual claimant of at least some of the machines reputation in the
second period.
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then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is clear the senior exerts no
e¤ort in either period. This is her optimal action in the nal period, and so in the penul-
timate period as well.
However, when the senior can buy and work with the machine, she can commit to
exert e¤ort in Period 1 (though not in Period 2). First note that the total output when
the senior and the machine work together is simply the sum of their output. Thus the
expected value of the output when the senior puts in e¤ort and works with the machine is
0 with probability (1 g)(1 ), it is 1 with probability g(1 )+(1 g) and it is 2 with
the residual probability g. If the senior does not exert e¤ort then the expected output
is 0 with probability (1   ) and 1 with probability , and there is no chance that the
output might be 2. When the senior works with the machine, however, it is assumed that
the production process is unobservable in the sense that when a single unit is produced,
customers cannot tell whether it was produced by the senior or the machine. In particular,
this implies that if customers expect the senior to exert e¤ort in period 1 and she does not,
then the machines reputation will in expectation be lower than it ought to be this could
induce the senior to exert e¤ort and so allow an equilibrium in which the senior credibly
commits to exerting e¤ort. This is the intuition underlying the following result.
Proposition 1 If g(1 )(1 g)+g(1 ) > c then there is a pure strategy subgame perfect equilib-
rium in which the senior exerts e¤ort in period 1. If in addition g(1   ) > c, this is the
unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following strategy: The senior buys the machine for 2. In the
rst period the senior works with the machine and exerts e¤ort. In the second period
(the seniors retirementperiod) the senior works alone and exerts no e¤ort and puts the
machine to work alone, collecting the fee for its output. Buyers believe that the senior
behaves in this way and bid for the good produced accordingly, revising their beliefs on the
quality of the machine according to Bayes rule after observing the quality of the Period 1
goods at the beginning of Period 2.
It is clear that the price of the machine is an equilibrium price and that the machine
owners behaviour in equilibrium is optimal. For the senior the strategies describe optimal
behaviour so long as she could do no better either by working on her own from the rst
period (the value of which as described above is 0) or by not exerting e¤ort in the rst
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period.14 Her value from sticking to the strategy is
g+   c  2+ g  1+ ((1  g)+ (1  )g) (1  g)
(1  g)+ g(1  ) + (1  g)(1  )  0 (1)
This expression can be explained as follows. Given the anticipated equilibrium strate-
gies the rst period revenue is g +  but the senior must incur the cost c of e¤ort and
buy the machine for 2. In the second period, when the output is 2 (which will happen in
equilibrium with probability g) the public is certain that the machine is good and will pay
1 in the second period; when the output is 0 (which happens with probability (1 g)(1 ))
the public is certain the machine is bad and is prepared to pay 0 in the second period; and,
when the output is 1 the belief that the machine is good (and so also the second period
revenue) is (1 g)(1 g)+g(1 ) . The expression in (1) can be simplied to g   c; it is simply the
value of the senior committing to exert e¤ort in the rst period and buying the machine
for exactly its expected output.
The value when the senior defects and exerts no e¤ort is given by:
g +   2+  (1  g)
(1  g)+ g(1  ) . (2)
This follows since she receives g+ in the rst period as customers expect her to exert
e¤ort but does not exert e¤ort or incur its cost, but now there is zero probability of the
realized output in the rst period being 2 and the probability of it being 1 is . So the
total value of deviating and not exerting e¤ort when it is anticipated is as appears in (2).
The value when she defects by not hiring is 0.15
So the strategies do indeed describe an equilibrium so long as g   c > 0 (following (1))
which is assumed to be true otherwise e¤ort would be ine¢ cient and so long as the senior
prefers to exert e¤ort in the rst period so that (1)>(2):
g   c > g   +  (1  g)
(1  g)+ g(1  ) (3)
or equivalently
g(1  )
(1  g)+ g(1  ) > c. (4)
14 It is clear that there is there is no second period strategy that dominates the one described.
15We suppose that on this o¤-equilibrium path customers believe that the senior will not exert e¤ort,
this would have to be the case, for example, if imposing a trembling-hand renement.
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Uniqueness in pure strategies:16 Now suppose that it is believed that the senior
exerts no e¤ort even when buying the machine. Suppose that the senior buys the machine
and exerts no e¤ort, the expected value of this strategy is 0. Suppose that the senior
deviates by exerting e¤ort, this yields the value:
 2+   c+ g(1  ) + (1  g) + g, (5)
where this expression can be explained as follows. The senior buys the machine at a cost
2 and since the machine is expected to produce high quality with probability  and she is
not expected to exert e¤ort, the rst period revenue is , in addition she incurs the cost of
e¤ort. In the second period, whether they see one or two high quality products, customers
will believe that the machine always produce high quality. The above expression can be
re-written as g(1 )  c and so the senior deviates and exerts e¤ort when g(1 ) > c.
It is clear that parameter values exist for which condition (4) can be satised, and that it
is more likely to be satised the smaller is c and the larger is g this follows naturally, since
the larger g or the smaller c the greater the gain from taking the costly action. However
the comparative statics with respect to  are not monotone. The intuition underlying this
non-monotonicity reects the discussion in the introduction of the need for su¢ cient
uncertainty, or having something to prove. At extremal values of  whether or not the
senior exerts e¤ort would not change the publics belief about the machine by much.17
Note in particular that for  close enough to 0 or 1 then the left hand side of inequality
(4) is close to 0 so that the condition fails. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which illustrates
combinations  and g for the case c = 0:1: an equilibrium in which the senior exerts e¤ort
exists to the left of the black line line (this is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies if
in addition the (; g) pair is below the red line).
Note that the seniors prots in an e¤ort-inducing equilibrium are independent of  so
long as it is in the range that supports the equilibrium the seniors prots over the two
periods are given by g c which is simply the value of the senior committing to exert e¤ort
in the rst period, (the other equilibrium revenues correspond to the senior buying the
machine for exactly the value of its expected output which she sells).
As a nal observation in this section, note that non-observability in joint production
16 It can be shown that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium where the senior buys the machine and
exerts e¤ort with probability q =  c+g g
cg(2 1) so long as q 2 (0; 1) and (2  )cg   g2(1  )  c2  0.
17Specically, note that in the case following an observation that the output is 1 the public belief about
the machine in the equilibrium is (1 g)
(1 g)+g(1 ) ; for  close to 0 or 1 this is close to .
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Figure 2: A Plot of lambda against g: Existence and Uniquencess at c=0.1
is crucial. Here non-observability arises in the sense that when the joint output is 1, the
public does not know whether the single unit was produced by the machine or the senior.
If instead this is observed, then the equilibrium described above breaks down the seniors
action would have no inuence on the reputation of the machine and on the price for which
its product is sold in the second period. In particular, if the senior exerts no e¤ort and
it is fully observed that the machine produces a single unit in the rst period, then the
machines output can still be sold for 1 in the second period so that the senior loses the
incentive to exert e¤ort in the rst period.
3 A richer model with OLG agents
The above example demonstrates that a senior can exploit the uncertainty about a ma-
chine in order to commit to an e¢ cient, though costly action through concern about the
reputation of the machine. However, the above example, though suggestive, is inadequate
for many applications. In particular, in trying to apply this reputational mechanism to
professional services, it is of more interest to think about introducing uncertainty through
working with other agents who also need incentives to exert e¤ort rather than machines
with no such need. In this section, we consider a richer framework which treats seniors
and juniors in a symmetric and consistent way.
We introduce a framework with overlapping generations of agents with a two period
working life then we characterize an equilibrium, which is the focus of this paper, where
agents exert costly and e¢ cient e¤ort in the rst period of life and in the second period
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only if their rmis successful in the rst period.
3.1 Model set-up
In an innite period framework, agents work for two periods, and can consume in a third
retirementperiod. A new generation of equal size is born in each period. An agent may
be either competent or inept.
Production Inept agents, whether exerting e¤ort or not, produce low quality products
for sure as do competent agents who exert no e¤ort. A competent agent who exerts e¤ort
at a cost c produces a high quality product for sure.18
An agent can either work on her own, producing as above, or alternatively, an agent can
work in a team with another agent, in which case the total output is the sum of the output
of each agent.19 However, in the case of joint production, if a single unit is produced then
the public cannot tell which of the agents produced it this assumption ensures that when
working together the seniors choice of e¤ort can a¤ect the reputation of the junior.20
All customers are willing to pay 1 for a high quality product and 0 for a low quality
product. All agents are risk neutral, maximise their expected lifetime earnings and have a
discount factor of 1.21
Information At birth, an agent does not know her own type and believes that there
is a probability  that she is competent. Potential employers and customers also believe
that there is a probability  that any new born agent is competent. It is assumed that
 > c so that inducing e¤ort from new born agents is e¢ cient.22
There are very many ex-ante identical locations; in particular, a new born agent can
always nd a location where there is no existing agent at which to found a new rm. At
each location there are many identical customers who Bertrand compete for the product
18Assuming that inepts and competents who exert no e¤ort produce high quality with probability b > 0
and competents exerting e¤ort produce high quality with probability g < 1 leads to qualitatively similar
results. This model is analyzed in the appendix.
19Allowing agents to work alone as well as in teams is a convenient modelling assumption. Without it,
in the case where a competent agent exerting e¤ort succeeded with a probability less than 1, the number
of successful agents (that is in teams with two successes) in each generation would fall. This assumption,
thus, allows us to consider a steady state with a positive fraction of successful agents.
20Note that this assumption can be weakened, in particular partial non-observability would do. For
example, the case that the seniors output could be seen independently of the juniors but a junior only
gets chance to prove herself if the senior exerts e¤ort would lead to similar results.
21The assumptions that agents are risk neutral and value the present and future equally are made for
ease of exposition and are not important for the qualitative results.
22 In the appendix, we consider the case where the junior knows her own type from birth and derive
qualitatively similar results.
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of the agent or agents at that location, so that the revenue that an agent generates when
working alone, for example, is equal to the customersbelief that the agent will produce
high quality.23 An agents productive history (that is the sequence of high or low quality
produced by the agent working alone or by the agent and her co-worker when working in
a team) is assumed to be non-veriable but observable, though only at the location where
it is produced. The assumption that the quality of the agents output is non-veriable
prevents the use of contracts contingent on this.
The assumption that the agents history is observable only at the location where she
has worked has two implications. First, when one agent has control over a location and
can exclude the other agent from its use, she can prevent the other agent from simply
moving to another location with no ill consequences, since in moving she would also lose
any positive reputation built up through previous high quality output. Thus a junior, in
order to keep her reputation, must buy the location (the rm) from the senior. Note,
however, that since there are innitely many such locations, this control is valuable only
after an agent has worked there and built up a reputation, but not before. Second, an
agent who has failed and consequently has a worse reputation than a new-born agent can
move to another location. Then an agent who failed in the rst period can pretend to be
a new-born agent. This implies that an agent cannot be severely punished for past actions
and so loosely speaking this assumption acts as a sort of renegotiation proof assumption
and highlights that the mechanism is doing much more than could be achieved by simple
repeated game considerations.24
Contracting As mentioned above, outcomes are observable at locations, so that cus-
tomersbeliefs can change over time, but these outcomes are not veriable so there is no
outcome-contingent contracting. Similarly, a senior cannot write an outcome contingent
contract with a junior. Employment contracts will be of the form (w;P ) where w species
the wage that the junior is paid and P species the price at which the junior will be able
to buy the rm (or equivalently control of the location) at the end of the period.25
23This assumption can be relaxed, similar qualitative results would hold so long as the price for output
is an increasing function in this belief.
24The case where an agents age is observable appears in the appendix. In that framework and in an
equilibrium characterized, customers would hold the belief that only agents who had failed would move and
so observing a second period agent in a new location e¤ectively reveals her history. In that case too, an
equilibrium in which agents exert e¤ort in the rst period of life and successful agents exert e¤ort in the
second period of life can be sustained.
25Similar results can be obtained if instead the senior o¤ers an employment contract of the form (w1; w2)
where w2 denotes a second period wage for the junior if retained and the senior keeps all revenues generated
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An agent thus has a rather complicated strategy. Specically, her strategy consists of:
 choice of mode of work in period 1 of career: work alone, work as an employee (if an
appropriate position is o¤ered), hire an employee;
 choice of mode of work in period 2 of career: move location or stay, hire an employee
(in which case the strategy will include a decision of the wage contract o¤ered), buy
the rm (if previously an employee), work as an employee (if an appropriate position
is o¤ered);
 e¤ort decision (in both periods of life).
An agents strategy will of course depend on outcomes and decisions in previous periods.
In each period, customers Bertrand compete for the goods that are produced before
observing quality. The quality is observed between periods and customers revise beliefs.
An agents strategy (such as whether to hire, buy the rm, exert e¤ort, relocate) for period
2 of course depends on the observable outcomes in previous periods.
Note that in the case where agents can only work alone and there is no hiring, the unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome is that no agent exerts e¤ort. With no reputational
incentives in the nal period of her career whatever the belief about the agent at that time
and no mechanism for contingent payments, there are no incentives for e¤ort in the nal
period of the career. It follows by backward induction there are no such incentives in the
rst period either. Moreover, even when allowing for joint production, there is always an
equilibrium where no agent exerts e¤ort. Suppose that the public believe that no agent ever
exerts e¤ort and would continue to believe this even after observing an agent producing
high quality, then this belief would be upheld in equilibrium since no agent will exert e¤ort
at a cost c when whether or not they do so, they sell their service at a price 0.
in that period. In this case, a constraint on equilibrium strategies would be that the senior only promotes a
junior who succeeded, thus providing incentives for the junior to work, in the spirit of the up-or-out models
of Kahn and Huberman (1988) and Prendergast (1993). In this case, for the promoted junior to have
incentives to exert e¤ort, she must gain from the future reputation of her own junior this can naturally
be interpreted as promotion to partnership. With the (w;P ) contract the senior always would want to sell
the rm, but it is worth more to a successful junior than an unsuccessful one, providing incentives for the
junior to work. Since in equilibrium only a successful junior would nd it worthwhile to buy the rm, the
senior has incentives in the rst period of the juniors life to ensure that the junior has the opportunity to
succeed. This is similar to the motivation for a partner to mentor in Morrison and Wilhelm (2003).
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3.2 An equilibrium with e¤ort
Despite the result that an equilibrium always exists where no agents exert e¤ort, allowing
for joint production can allow other equilibria which do induce e¤ort.
Proposition 2 If 1  c+ c2   3c(2 )2  0 then there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
in which all agents exert e¤ort in the rst period of their careers, and competent agents
exert e¤ort in the second period.
Proof. We prove this result by construction, outlining equilibrium strategies and verifying
that these strategies do indeed characterize an equilibrium.
Specically, the strategies are as follows:
In the rst period of life, either an agent founds her own rm, working on her own in
an unoccupied location or accepts a position as an employee if o¤ered one at su¢ ciently
attractive terms; in either case she exerts e¤ort in the rst period of her own life. If she
founds her own rm and fails in the rst period, then she poses as a new-born agent. If she
succeeds in the rst period of life after founding her own rm, then in the second period
she hires a junior (o¤ering a wage contract that pays w and o¤ers the rm at P ) and they
work together with the founder exerting e¤ort.
Alternatively an agent might begin life as an employee in an established rm with a
(w;P ) contract, so long as such a contract o¤ers her in equilibrium at least as much lifetime
earnings as founding her own rm. She exerts e¤ort in the rst period of life. If the rm
as a whole produced one or no high quality outputs, she chooses not to buy the rm but
instead poses as a new born agent. If the rm produced two high quality outputs then she
buys the rm at the specied price P , hires her own junior o¤ering her junior the contract
(w;P ) and she works together with her junior and exerts e¤ort.
A second period agent posing as a newborn either works alone or works as an employee
if o¤ered a position and if w is at least as great as the wage she could earn when working
alone.
In the equilibrium described below, all agents exert e¤ort in the rst period of life and
so all competents succeed in the rst period of life. Thus the population of those who
appear to be new borns consists of a measure 1 of true new borns and a measure 1   of
second period inepts posing as new born, thus the probability that an agent posing as a
new born is competent is  = 2  .
26
26 In the case where a competent agent exerting e¤ort succeeds with probability g < 1, and an inept or
competent exerting no e¤ort with probability b > 0, things are a little di¤erent. An issue which arises in
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Figure 3: Equilibrium behaviour
It is common knowledge among the public and all agents that these are the equilibrium
strategies and prices are set appropriately, with the industry capturing the full consumer
surplus. Thus the price of the output of a new-born agent (or of an agent pretending to
be new born) working alone is  since there is a probability 12  that she truly is new-
born, in this case she exerts e¤ort in equilibrium and so generates high quality output with
probability  (the probability that the new born is competent). When an agent has suc-
ceeded then it is known that she is competent and will produce high quality products with
certainty in the following period when exerting e¤ort. The on-equilibrium path behaviour
and strategies are summarized in Figure 3.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, one must also consider o¤-equilibrium
beliefs:
 if an agent does not o¤er the contract (w;P ) then any potential juniors who will not
have seen her history assume that she has previously failed;27 and nally,
this case, is that the probability of someone who appears to be new-born truly is new-born will depend
on the fraction of second-period agents who had previously been working alone rather than as employees.
Solving for a steady state, where the proportion of those starting their working lives as employees closes
the model, which appears in the appendix.
27Note that although this does not imply that an agent will reject any o¤er (in particular, she would
accept any o¤er with very high w and/or low P ); however she would reject any o¤er that an inept senior
could make to her and which would allow such a senior to make a non-negative prot by hiring her. Further
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 when an apparently new born agent hires, in this o¤-equilibrium action, customers
suppose that the agent must be a second-period inept agent.
The value of a new born who begins her career by founding her own rm is given by:
Vf =   c+ (1 +   c  w + P ) + (1  )(w + (1  )). (6)
This expression is built up as follows. On observing an agent who appears to be
new-born working alone, customers believe that she is a competent new born agent with
probability . The new born agent, who exerts e¤ort and knows that she is new born
expects success with probability  and in this case she is revealed as competent, she hires
another agent as a junior whose product is expected to be worth  and so can charge 1+
for the joint service (hiring the junior costs her w, further she exerts e¤ort at a cost c)
and in case of two successes, which occurs with probability , she sells the rm earning
P . Following a failure in the rst period, the agent can pose as a new-born agent and so
receive the revenue w if hired, which occurs with probability  since in equilibrium there
is a measure  of hiring agents and 1 + 1   is the measure of agents claiming to be new
born; if not hired then the agent works alone and earns .
Similarly, the value for a new born agent who works as an employee is given by the
following expression:
Ve = w   c+ (1 +   c  w   P + P ) + (1  )(w + (1  )). (7)
In equilibrium, a new born agent is willing to become a junior or equivalently Ve  Vf .
In particular, this implies that:
w     P  0. (8)
In addition, a second period agent posing as a new born should be willing to be hired
as a junior.28 Specically, this condition is given by:
w   (9)
note that as discussed below, by o¤ering (w;P ) a competent senior in e¤ect o¤ers the junior a contract
which compensates her for her outside option (working alone); the senior can therefore o¤er no less in
expected terms.
28 It can easily be shown that no equilibrium exists in which only new-borns are willing to work as
employees and only the population of those working alone consist of true new-borns and posers.
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Given that there is a scarcity of junior slots available, hiring seniors will drive down
the value that the contracts deliver to employees to the point where they are indi¤erent.
In particular this implies:
w = + P . (10)
It will come as no surprise that a later condition will ensure that P > 0 and so (10)
implies (9).
Conditions (9) and (10) can be thought of as individual rationality conditions. The
remaining deviations can be categorized into a number of separate groups (i) exert ef-
fort (incentive compatibility) (ii) hiring policy and (iii) buying the rm. Each group is
considered in turn.
(i) exert e¤ort (incentive compatibility)
For a second period agent who had been successful there is an incentive compatibility
constraint which is identical in both the case that she worked alone in the rst period
and the case when she buys the rm from her employer specically, this constraint is as
follows:
P  c (11)
In the rst period in both cases, that the agent works alone or as a junior, it must be
worthwhile to exert e¤ort. The corresponding incentive compatibility conditions are the
following:
1 +   c  w + P   (w + (1  ))  c

(12)
and
1 +   c  w   P + P   (w + (1  ))  c

(13)
Note that by (11), it follows that (13) implies (12).
(ii) hiring policy
Without hiring in the second period of life, the agent could not commit to e¤ort and
so the best that she could do is pose as a new-born and earn w + (1   ) and so the
conditions that a second period agent who had success when working alone in the rst
period does indeed prefer to hire a junior is given by:
1 +   c  w + P  w + (1  ) (14)
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which is implied by (12). The same condition ensures that a second period agent who
had been an employee and bought the rm, prefers to hire.
Suppose that an agent failed in the rst period of life, then she must be inept and a
single success would prove that her junior was competent and so a su¢ cient condition that
would ensure that she does not hire is given by:
w + (1  )    w + P . (15)
Finally, since customers hold the o¤ equilibrium belief that any apparent new born
attempting to hire must be a failed second period agent, the condition that ensures no
second period agent posing as a new born hires is also given by (15). A true new born
agent would not hire when Vf = Ve   w+P +w+(1 ) (note in the rst period
of life, customers would hold the belief that she must be a failed second period agent).
Note that Vf  w + w + (1   ) by (13) and so (10) and  = 2  <  ensures that a
true new born would not hire.
(iii) Buying the rm
An employee who had succeeded would indeed buy the rm so long as this generates
more value than her alternative posing as a new born. This is the case when:
1 +   c  w   P + P  w + (1  ) (16)
This is implied by (13):
An employee who had failed is revealed as inept, and so rather than spending P > 0 to
remain in this location, she would rather costlessly move to another location and pose as
a new born agent where she would have a higher reputation.
Thus su¢ cient conditions are (10), (11), (13), and (15). Substituting for  = 2  and
for w from (10), these conditions can be reduced to 1    c  (2 )c2 + c2  P  c(2 ) ,
or equivalently:
1    c+ c
2
  3c(2  )
2
 0 (17)
This concludes the proof.
The characterized equilibrium relies on the seniors ability to commit in advance to the
price at which she will sell the rm.29 The junior either buys the rm (and goes on to her
29 In general, many ex-post bargaining schemes which share the benets of the juniors accumulated
reputation between the senior and junior would lead to qualitatively similar results.
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own junior) or else leaves. Since the senior can commit to a price for the rm, the juniors
incentive problem is resolved since there are rewards to working hard, being revealed as
competent and buying the rm. The seniors incentive problem is resolved since her action
a¤ects the juniors reputation, and only a junior with a good reputation would be willing
to buy the rm.
A junior with accumulated reputation buys the rm since locations are assumed to be
informationally separate and the senior controls access to the existing location, so that a
junior who leaves would have to forego her accumulated reputation.
Note that the result that all competent agents exert e¤ort in the second period of their
careers relies on the simplifying assumptions that a competent agent who exerts e¤ort
produces high quality for sure and that an inept produces low quality for sure. Thus
in the equilibrium described, a competent is always recognized as such. Relaxing these
assumptions, would suggest that mistakes are possible (that is a competent agent may not
be recognized as such by the end of the rst period), but a qualitatively similar result
holds whereby under parameter restrictions all agents exert e¤ort in the rst period of
their careers and successful agents in the second.
Further note, that as in the illustrative example of Section 2, uncertainty plays an
important role. The equilibrium condition (17) fails for  close to 0 or 1, as illustrated in
Figure 4, which plots c against  where the condition is satised below the line.
1    c+ c2   3c(2 )2 = 0
4 Discussion
The model builds on a number of assumptions which are worthy of further discussion.
First, we assumed that there was no static advantage or disadvantage in having agents
work in teams rather than as individuals. A teams production was assumed to be simply
given by the sum of individual members contributions. Although, it is perhaps more
reasonable to suppose that there may be important complementarities in team production,
perhaps that a teams output is determined by its weakest member, the model deliberately
ignored such considerations. First, it can be shown that similar qualitative results (that
seniors hire juniors to create a reputational concern to overcome a commitment problem)
can be obtained with other joint production functions. More importantly, focusing on
the additive case is intended to demonstrate that the e¤ects identied in this paper are
informational and not the result of a joint production technology which in itself is more or
less e¢ cient than solo production.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium condition: c against lambda
This assumption that agents are either competent or inept, rather than competent or
a Stackelberg type, means that over time uncertainty is resolved and an agents type is
learned. In the stark models considered here, this implies that an agent would have no
reputational incentives.30 Hiring juniors as a mechanism to introduce uncertainty and allow
seniors to overcome this lack of incentives relies on a couple of assumptions. Specically,
that the seniors choice of actions can a¤ect customersinformation about the junior and
that the senior cares about how customers will perceive the junior or equivalently that the
senior is the residual claimant on at least some fraction of her co-workers reputation in
the next period. The former is implied by the much-noted and intuitive property of team
production that it is di¢ cult to attribute the specic contributions of individuals within
teams (see particularly Holmstrom (1982)). The latter is addressed in this paper by an
assumption that a junior cannot leave the employment of the senior with her reputation
intact.
There are a number of reasons which can explain why the senior might be able to prot
from a co-workers future reputation. In the central model, we assumed that the senior
controls access to the location where they work (for example in the context of professional
30 In Holmstrom (1999) a good agent performs better even when exerting no e¤ort and so a young
agent may have some incentives to work but such incentives are diminished or disappear as the principal
or customers learn the agents type. We abstract from this e¤ect by assuming that e¤ort and ability are
complimentary.
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services it seems natural to think of this as access to clients or a non-compete clause in
the juniors contract) and that agents build reputation only at the location where they
work. Then if the co-worker leaves, she cannot take her reputation with her. This seems a
reasonable assumption for law-rm associates for example and given the use of non-compete
clauses is likely to apply to junior partners. Thus, although there are many locations where
an agent might choose to work at the beginning of her career which are ex-ante identical,
control of the location acts as a valuable asset ex-post.
Levin and Tadelis (2002) cite evidence on the prevalence of non-compete clauses in the
US. In the UK Richard Turnor (2001), for example, states that most professional service
rms employ restrictive covenants binding outgoing members and describes that:
Typical restrictive covenants include, for example:
(a) a clause preventing the outgoing partner from acting for those who have
been clients of the rm, or of the particular partner in a specied period (say
two years) before his retirement, such restriction applying for a period of two,
three or even ve years after retirement;
(b) a clause preventing the outgoing partner from practising at all for a
specied period in a specied geographical area;
(c) clauses preventing any activity within a specied period which involve
the provision of services in a way which competes with the business of the rm
However, the e¤ectiveness of such restrictive covenants is imperfect, as discussed for
example in Rebitzer and Taylor (2001). The qualitative results of this paper would apply
even if such covenants were imperfect as long as they had some su¢ cient e¤ect.
In this paper, the senior can act as the residual claimant on all of the juniors reputa-
tional gains and so the junior might have little incentive to exert e¤ort for the sake of her
reputation unless the senior can reward her for such e¤ort. The senior cannot contract with
a junior directly on the basis of the output produced as this is assumed to be non-veriable
(or else there would be no need for reputational incentives as explicit contractual incentives
would su¢ ce). To overcome this problem, we suppose that the senior can commit to a price
at which she would sell the rm to the junior. The price is set in equilibrium at a level
which would allow some returns to a successful junior providing the junior with incentives
and at which only a successful junior would be willing to buy, ensuring that the senior
has an incentive to exert e¤ort and so give the junior an opportunity of succeeding. An
equivalent formulation is to suppose that contracts can be made contingent on the task
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to which the junior is assigned in the second period that is a contract could allow for a
di¤erent second period wage (a severance payo¤) for a junior who is red to one who is
retained. As discussed by Kahn and Huberman (1988) and Prendergast (1993), promotion
or task assignment can be e¤ective in providing incentives when task assignment is at the
discretion of the employer only when the expected marginal productivity of the employee
di¤ers in the di¤erent jobs.31 In particular when this property holds, then task assignment
can act as a quasi-contingent contract an aspect which is important for the equilibrium
characterized.32
5 Conclusions
This paper highlights the pivotal role of uncertainty for robust reputational incentives and
that an agent can strategically introduce such uncertainty without damaging her existing
reputation. We suggest that hiring and working with a junior with uncertain reputation
as a strategic choice can endogenously introduce the uncertainty required for reputational
incentives and in this way allow an agent to commit to exerting e¢ cient though costly
e¤ort. In particular, it is perhaps worth re-iterating that whereas typically teamwork is
thought to reduce individualsincentives and lead to a free-rider problem, here if only solo
production were possible (and even if this were more e¢ cient in a complete contracting
world) there would be no incentives for e¤ort. The crucial aspects in establishing this
result are that a senior and junior can work together in a non-attributable production
process and that the senior can gain from the future reputation of the junior. Incentives
for the junior are provided by committing to a price at which the junior can buy the rm
or equivalently to an up-or-out promotion scheme in which for the promoted agent to have
incentives to exert e¤ort, promotion must be to a position where the promoted employee
lays claim to future revenue generated by her own junior. This has a natural interpretation
as promotion to partnership.
In the context of professional services, the inspiration for this paper, the conclusion that
agents are motivated by a concern for their own reputations when young, and when old
(and successful) for the reputation of the rm that they own does not seem unreasonable.
31This would be the case here a successful agent is worth more to the senior in the promoted position
and by committing to the wage in this position, the senior can commit to reward the junior for success.
32Alternative treatments of up-or-out promotion rules include Milton Harris and Yoram Weiss (1984),
which generate up-or-out rules based on learning with nite lifetime and risk aversion, H. Lorne Carmichael
(1988) which introduces a model of tenure built on the insight that current workers are best informed to
select new workers, and Brendan OFlaherty and Aloysius Siow (1992) and (1995), which are based on the
scarcity of junior slots used to assess suitability for a senior slot.
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An important aspect in this paper is that rms or teams are small often a reasonable
assumption in such industries and so other models which have considered the interaction
of individual and collective reputations and assumed that rms either consist of a single
individual or very many individuals, are unable to consider such as a result.33 Other
instances where agents may be choosing to endogenously introduce uncertainty or choose
to allow the reputations of a small number of agents or good to interact might include a
rms turnover policy (hiring and ring at a more aggregate level) and some instances of
product bundling.
This paper has suggested direct ownership (in Section 3.3) or ex-post control of location,
perhaps through restrictive covenants (in Section 3.4), as a means by which a senior can gain
from the reputation of the machine or a junior.34 Another alternative might be to suppose
that the agent is exploiting uncertainty about another dimension of her own capability;
as a specic example suppose that there is certainty that the agent is competent but
uncertainty about her ability to select good candidates, then without recourse to directly
gaining a benet from the revenues that the good reputation of a junior can generate, the
senior would have a reputational concern but over a di¤erent dimension of her ability.
Other aspects of the model which might be developed or extended are the restrictions
to a binary e¤ort choice and two types of agent. Relaxing these assumptions may yield
interesting results. In particular it is not hard to imagine that in a more sophisticated
model seniors would di¤er according to the history of their previous employer (and their
employers previous employer and so on). This would suggest that a rms age is important
and further, that working for a di¤erent type of senior (or a rm of di¤erent age) would
33Note that even within large law rms, individual departments or groups which are typically small have
their own reputations and compensation even of partners is often tied to the performance of the individual
departments.
As suggestive evidence on the rst of these point, it is worth noting that law rm directories will rank
a rm with respect to di¤erent specialization (and a typical specialization in a law rm will have a fairly
small number of partners). In another industry, the observation that in investment banking often one sees
small teams moving as teams is also revealing.
Further on compensation being determined at a fairly decentralized level. James D. Cotterman (2001),
for example, discussing law rms states that:
Historically a prominent compensation method, the lockstep approach is now the least pre-
ferred way of allocating compensation.
Cotterman argues that performance-based measures and to some extent compensation based on the
revenue that a partner has generated (eat what you kill) are important features of partnerscompensation.
34Another possibility is explicit bonding a junior buys a share in a partnership which is returned only
on retirement.
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entail a di¤erent employment contract. Another aspect which might be protably relaxed
is the form of the joint production function, the choice of an additive production function
in which joint production is the sum of individual contributions is useful in highlighting the
purely informational role in obscuring those individual contributions, but introducing some
complementarity in joint production would perhaps be more realistic and could enrich the
model.
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Appendices
A Agents know their own types at birth
In this section, we adapt the model presented in Section 3 and suppose that agents know
their own types at birth. Analogous to the equilibrium described in there, we construct an
equilibrium in which competent agents exert e¤ort. Specically, we distinguish between a
competent and an inept agent. In equilibrium the following occurs:
In the rst period of life, a competent agent either founds her own rm, working on
her own in an unoccupied location or accepts a position as an employee if o¤ered one at
su¢ ciently attractive terms; in either case she exerts e¤ort in the rst period of her own
life. In equilibrium in either case she will succeed (since it is assumed that a competent
agent who exerts e¤ort succeeds). If she had founded her own rm, then in the second
period she hires a junior (o¤ering a wage contract that pays w and o¤ers the rm at P )
and they work together with the founder exerting e¤ort.
Alternatively she might begin life as an employee in an established rm with a (w;P )
contract, so long as such a contract o¤ers her in equilibrium at least as much lifetime
earnings as founding her own rm. She exerts e¤ort in the rst period of life. In equilibrium,
the rm produces two high quality outputs and she buys the rm at the specied price P ,
hires her own junior o¤ering her junior the contract (w;P ) and she works together with
her junior and exerts e¤ort.
An inept agent might begin life either as an employee or founding her own rm. In
either case she exerts no e¤ort, fails and poses as a new-born in the following period,
accepting employment as an employee or founding her own rm.
It is clear that an inept agent, knowing that she is inept, would never exert e¤ort (it is
costly but otherwise does not a¤ect outcomes) and would be willing to work as an employee
so long as:
w   (18)
For the competent agent, following the strategy outlined above yields:
CVf =   c+ (1 +   c  w + P ). (19)
when starting life by founding her own rm, and
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CVe = w   c+ (1 +   c  w   P + P ). (20)
when starting as an employee. Note that in contrast to the expressions in (6) and (7)
the competent agent, knowing that she is competent knows that she will succeed.
In equilibrium, a new born agent is willing to become a junior or equivalently CVe 
CVf . In particular, this implies that:
w     P  0. (21)
Given that there is a scarcity of junior slots available, hiring seniors will drive down
the value that the contracts deliver to employees to the point where they are indi¤erent,
in particular this implies:
w = + P . (22)
The remaining deviations can be categorized into a number of separate groups (i) exert
e¤ort (incentive compatibility) (ii) hiring policy and (iii) buying the rm. Each group is
considered in turn.
(i) exert e¤ort (incentive compatibility)
For a second period agent who had been successful there is an incentive compatibility
constraint which is identical in both the case that she worked alone in the rst period
and the case when she is now a manager specically, this constraint is:
P  c. (23)
In the rst period in both cases, that the agent works alone or as a junior, it must be
worthwhile to exert e¤ort. The corresponding incentive compatibility conditions are the
following:
1 +   c  w + P  c (24)
and
1 +   c  w   P + P  c (25)
Note that by (23), it follows that P  0 and so (24) implies (25).
Trivially an inept agent does not exert e¤ort
(ii) hiring policy
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Without hiring in the second period of life, the agent could not commit to e¤ort and
so the best that she could do is pose as a new-born (and earn w + (1   )) and so the
conditions that a second period agent who had success when working alone in the rst
period does indeed prefer to hire a junior is given by:
+ 1  c  w + P  w + (1  ) (26)
The same condition ensures that a second period agent who had been an employee and
bought the rm, prefers to hire.
Suppose that an agent failed in the rst period of life, then she must be inept and a
single success would prove that her junior was competent and so a su¢ cient condition that
would ensure that she does not hire is given by:
w + (1  )   w + P . (27)
Finally, since customers hold the o¤ equilibrium belief that any apparent new born
attempting to hire must be a failed second period agent. The conditions that ensure no
second period agent posing as a new born hires is also given by (27). A true new born
agent, whether competent or inept, would not hire when this condition holds.
(iii) Buying the rm
An employee who had succeeded would indeed buy the rm so long as this generates
more value than her alternative posing as a new born. This is the case when:
1 +   c  w   P + P  w + (1  ) (28)
An employee who had failed is revealed as inept, and so rather than spending P > 0
to remain in this location, she would rather costlessly move to another location and pose
as a new born agent where she would have a higher reputation. Note that (28) and (23)
imply (26).
Thus su¢ cient conditions for the strategies to form an equilibrium are (22), (23), (24),
(27), and (28). Substituting for w =  + P from (22), and  = 2  , these inequalities
reduce to minf (2 )(1 c) 2(2 ) ; (1 2c)(2 )2(1 ) g  P  c(2 ) , with (c; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1]. A
su¢ cient condition is:
(2  )((1 + c)  4c)  2  0 (29)
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Figure 5: Su¢ cient condition for equilibrium (know own type): c against lambda
This proves the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 If (29) holds then there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which com-
petent agents exert e¤ort in both periods of their careers.
Condition (29) is illustrated in the Figure 5 , where combinations of (c; ) below the
line satisfy the condition.
B Case with g < 1, b > 0 and age observable
In this section, we alter the framework and suppose that a competent agent exerting e¤ort
succeeds with a probability g < 1 and that a competent agent who exerts no e¤ort succeeds
with probability b > 0, this is also the probability of success for an inept agent. We assume
g > b. Further, it is convenient to assume that in addition to the options of working
alone or working in a team, agents have the option of leaving the industry and claiming a
(per-period) outside option of R.
Proposition 4 There are parameter values and strategies which allow a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium in which all agents exert e¤ort in the rst period of life, and agents who produce
high quality when working alone in the rst period or work in a rm, that produces two
high quality products, as a junior exert e¤ort in period 2 of their lives.
In the rst period of life an agent either founds her own rm, working on her own in
an unoccupied location or as a junior for an agent currently in the second period of life; in
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either case she exerts e¤ort in the rst period of her own life. If she founds her own rm
and fails in the rst period, then she leaves the industry and claims her outside option R. If
she succeeds in the rst period of life after founding her own rm, then in the second period
she hires a junior (o¤ering a wage contract that pays w1 and wm2 following a promotion)
and they work together with the founder exerting e¤ort. In the nal (retirement) period,
she promotes a junior to manager (and pays the managers fee wm2 ) if the rm as a whole
produced two high quality units in the previous period and otherwise res the junior.
Alternatively an agent might begin life as an employee in an established rm with a
(w1; w
m
2 ) contract. She exerts e¤ort in the rst period of life. If the rm as a whole
produced one or no high quality outputs, she is red and leaves the industry, earning her
outside option R. If the rm produced two high quality outputs then she will be retained
as manager and paid wm2 , in which case she must hire her own junior o¤ering her junior
the contract (w1; wm2 ); in this case she works together with her junior and exerts e¤ort and
at the end of the period gains control of the rm. In the nal period, she promotes her
junior to manager if the rm as a whole produced to high quality units in the pervious
period and otherwise res the junior.
The public and all agents believe that these are the equilibrium strategies and prices
are set appropriately, with the industry capturing the full consumer surplus. Thus the
price of the output of a new-born agent working alone is p() := g + (1  )b since there
is a probability  that she is competent (and in equilibrium she is expected to exert e¤ort
and generate high quality output with probability g) and otherwise inept. To simplify
notation, let the expected probability of success from a new-born agent when exerting
e¤ort be n = p(); let s = gp be the belief that an agent seen to have had a success is
competent and let s = p(s) be the probability that an agent who had previously had a
success has another success when exerting e¤ort. With this notation, the behaviour along
possible equilibrium paths, as described in the paragraph above, is illustrated in the gure
below.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, one must also specify beliefs con-
cerning o¤-equilibrium actions:
 if a senior and junior were both successful in the previous period and the senior did
not promote the junior to manager but instead sought to retain her as a lone worker,
then the un-promoted junior would have no concern for the future and so would not
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Figure 6: Behaviour on possible equilibrium paths
exert e¤ort and the revenue generated would be b. We impose that in this case the
senior would have to pay the un-promoted junior at least her outside option R and
characterize this condition explicitly below, calling it the honest senior condition
(43);
 if the senior hires a junior as manager following failure, we assume in this section
that the newly promoted manager will not exert e¤ort;
 when an agent who had been successful does not hire, again there would be no
possibility of retirement period revenues or wages and so the agent would not exert
e¤ort in the current period, as there are no future revenues for such e¤ort to a¤ect;
thus this deviation is equivalent to the second period individual rationality conditions
discussed below;
 when an agent who failed does hire, then we assume that the o¤-equilibrium beliefs
are that this senior will not exert e¤ort;
 if an agent does not o¤er the contract (w1; wm2 ) then any potential juniors who will
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not have seen her history assume that she has previously failed; and nally,
 if an agent who is not expected to hire does so, she must o¤er the contract (w1; wm2 )
but she is not expected to exert e¤ort by customers and so does not raise the same
revenues that a successful agent would; however, in this case customersupdating
on the basis of output will be di¤erent and specically one high quality output may
be su¢ cient to win the junior a promotion such a deviation is considered explicitly
below in Equation (41) and a new born agent deviating by seeking to hire in the rst
period is addressed by (42).
Note that the expected equilibrium value of beginning life by founding a rm (starting
solo) is:
Vs = n  c+ n[s+ n  c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 )] + (1  n)R (30)
This expression is derived as follows. In the rst period the agent sells her service at
a price n and exerts e¤ort; if she fails, which occurs with probability (1   n), then in the
second period she leaves the industry and so in the second period earns R. If she succeeds
in the rst period (which occurs with probability n) then it is known that she must be
competent with probability s, she hires a junior and sells their joint output at its expected
value s+ n, given that she exerts e¤ort as does a new born agent, and she must also pay
the junior w1. Finally in the third period, if a senior and her junior succeeded in the
second period, which occurs with probability sn, then again it must be that the junior is
competent with probability s and so when promoted to manager generates a revenue of
s + n (which is the expected value of the manager and her juniors output) but must be
paid wm2 . (We assume that the manager hires and pays her own junior but her wage is
contingent on doing so). If a senior and junior fail in the second period, then in the third
period the junior is red, and the senior gains no revenue.
Similarly, the expected value for a new born agent who begins by working as a junior
in joint production is given by the following expression.
Vj = w1   c+ sn[wm2   c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 )] + (1  sn)R (31)
The proof proceeds by construction; we characterize su¢ cient conditions for the pa-
rameters which ensure that the strategies described are indeed equilibrium strategies and
verify that there are parameter values which satisfy all the relevant constraints.
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First, we suppose that a junior refuses any contract other than (w1; wm2 ). In addition
it must be that the a new agent is willing to become a junior or equivalently Vj  Vf and
given the scarcity of such opportunities, the employer would be in a position to ensure that
Vj = Vs
Vj = Vs . (32)
The remaining constraints fall into a number of categories. Specically, these categories
can be summarized under the headings (i) exit or remain in industry (individual rationality)
(ii) exert e¤ort (incentive compatibility) (iii) hiring policy and (iv) promotion policy.
The individual rationality constraints ensure that an agent prefers to stick to the strat-
egy described to leaving the industry, either at the beginning of life or later when the
strategy requires staying (for example following a high quality output when working alone
in the rst period). Individual rationality also requires that when the strategy requires
that an agent leaves the industry, she prefers to do so than to remain within it. The rst
and second period incentive compatibility conditions ensure that an agent prefers to exert
e¤ort when the strategy requires her to do so.
The conditions on hiring policy are rst that an agent hires in period 2 when in period
1 she had been in a successfulrm, that is one that produced two high quality goods
if she was there as a junior or where she produced one high quality good in a rm that
she had founded on her own. In addition, we characterize su¢ cient conditions that ensure
that an agent who had not been in a successful rm in period 1 does not hire in period 2,
and that no agent hires in period 1.
Finally, on promotion policy the value of promoting a junior to manager in a successful
rm must be greater than either the value of retaining the junior or ring her and a manager
must prefer to re a junior in an unsuccessful than retain or promote her.
Proof. The remaining deviations are categorized into the following groups (i) exit or
remain in industry (individual rationality) (ii) exert e¤ort (incentive compatibility) (iii)
hiring policy and (iv) promotion policy. Each group is considered in turn and then we
verify that there are indeed parameters at which all the requisite constraints are satised.
(i) exit or remain in industry (individual rationality)
It must be the case that pursuing these strategies from birth is preferred to exercising
the outside option:
Vs  2R (33)
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and Vj  2R or equivalently
w1   c+ sn[wm2   c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 ) R] R  0 . (34)
Note that (32) makes one of (34) and (33) redundant.
For a second period agent, the corresponding individual rationality constraints (the
constraint that she wishes to remain in the industry and stick with the equilibrium strate-
gies) depend on whether the agent worked alone in a rm she founded in her rst period
of life or was successful as a junior in a team that produced two high quality outputs. The
conditions are given respectively by:
s+ n  c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 )  R , (35)
wm2   c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 )  R . (36)
Note that in (36) it is crucial that the agent cannot leave with her reputation intact
this follows from the assumption of informationally separate locations and that control of
locations is determined by seniority.35
For an agent who failed when working alone or as a junior, she prefers to leave the
industry so long as
R  b. (37)
Note that an agent who failed would be unable to hire a junior (see (41) below) and
so with only one period of working life remaining and no reputational concerns would be
unable to commit to exerting e¤ort and so would generate only b in revenue if she remained
in the industry.
(ii) exert e¤ort (incentive compatibility)
For a second period agent who had been successful there is an incentive compatibility
constraint which is identical in both the case that she worked alone in the rst period
and the case when she is now a manager specically, this constraint is as follows:
s+ n  wm2  
c
sn
 0 . (38)
35 In the context of partnerships, restrictive covenants or bonding might be more plausible constraints
which would allow a senior to claim at least some of the revenue attributable to a junior who succeeded,
such mechanisms would operate in an informationally unied market.
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In the rst period in both cases, that the agent work as a founder or as a junior, it
must be worthwhile to exert e¤ort. The corresponding incentive compatibility conditions
are the following:
s+ n  c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 ) R 
c
n
 0 , (39)
and
wm2   c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 ) R 
c
sn
 0 . (40)
Note that these two equations imply (35) and (36) respectively and since   cn    csn
and by (38) s+ n  wm2 it follows that (40) and (38) imply (39).
(iii) hiring policy
Without hiring in the second period of life, the agent could not commit to e¤ort and
so the conditions that a second period agent who had success when working alone in the
rst period does indeed prefer to hire a junior is given by:
s+ n  c  w1 + sn(s+ n  wm2 )  R
this is precisely (35) and by (37) which states R > b, this is the most protable deviation
(that is it is more protable to leave the industry if not hiring rather than remaining in
the industry and earning b). Similarly the corresponding condition that a manager prefers
to hire is implied by (36) and (37).
Suppose that an agent failed in the rst period of life, imposing the o¤-equilibrium
belief that if she were to hire she would exert no e¤ort, then a su¢ cient condition that
would ensure that she does not hire is given by:
R  b+ n  w1 + (b+ n)(s+ n  wm2 ). (41)
This condition is su¢ cient to ensure that such an agent does not hire but is not neces-
sary. Given that the senior does not exert e¤ort the rst period revenue is b + n   w1; if
two successes ensue then the public believe that the junior is competent with probability
s and if observing one success this belief would be
g(1  b) + (1  g)b
g(1  b) + (1  g)b+ 2(1  )b(1  b) < 
s.
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Consider a the value earned by an agent (who had previously failed) and hires in the
second period of her life, when customers are over-optimistic in the sense that they believed
that a junior who worked for such a senior was competent with probability s when between
them the senior and junior managed at least one success. This is the right hand side of (41)
and since the condition states that even under these unrealistically favorable conditions an
agent who had previously failed would still not want hire, this is a su¢ cient condition to
ensure that such an agent does not hire. Note that in (41) implicitly it is assumed that
customers in this o¤-equilibrium path believe that the senior would exert no e¤ort. We
have discussed this this o¤-equilibrium belief above.
Finally, the condition that a new born agent prefers not to hire is given by:
Vjoint = Vsolo  2n w1 c+n2[s+n c w1+s+n wm2 +sn(s+n wm2 )]+(1 n2)R . (42)
In this last expression we suppose that the new born agent exerts e¤ort and that
following one success the updated belief 12(
s+ (1 g)(1 g)+(1 )(1 b)) is relatively small so that
an agent with such a reputation would prefer to exercise her outside option.
(iv) Promotion policy
First, a senior must be honest, that is she must prefer to promote to manager a junior
who had been successful. This conditions is given by:36
s+ n  wm2  R . (43)
In addition for the equilibrium characterized a senior in a rm with either one or
two failures should not want to promote. This might be the case for example if the o¤-
equilibrium beliefs in this case were that the promoted senior would exert no e¤ort then
the relevant condition no promotion condition would be:
0   wm2 + b+ n (44)
Verication
Thus su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium are (32), (33), (37), (38), (40), (41), (42),
(43) and (44). It can be easily veried that there are indeed parameter values and corre-
36Note that if the senior attempted to retain the junior without promoting her, then the retained junior
would raise no more than b in revenue which is less than her outside option by (37), which is the very
least that she must be paid. Thus the senior would prefer to re the junior rather than retain her without
promotion.
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sponding wages (w1; wm2 ) for which these conditions are satised. For example they are
satised when  = 0:45, g = 0:9, b = R = 0:1, c = 0:05 and w1 = 0:565 and wm2 = 1:124.
C A nite horizon up-or-out e¤ort inducing equilibrium
First a three period career concern model is introduced in which reputational considerations
lead to e¤ort in the rst period but not in the second of life for an agent working alone.
We characterize restrictions which ensure that this is the case. Next it is shown that an
agent who had been successful in the rst period of life can commit to exerting e¤ort in
the second period of her life by hiring a new born agent of uncertain quality, even though
that agent will have no opportunity to hire her own agent and will only exert e¤ort in the
rst period of her own life.
It is supposed that there are two types of agent. A good agent and a bad agent. A
good agent di¤ers from a bad agent in two ways. First she is more likely to be successful
than a bad agent even when she exerts no e¤ort and second, e¤ort has a greater impact
on her chances of generating success. Specically suppose that a bad agent always fails
whether exerting e¤ort or not and a good agent succeeds with probability g with no e¤ort
and with probability g+ e when exerting e¤ort. Exerting e¤ort costs c. Initially the agent
and labour market share the prior that the agent is good with probability .
Note that following any successes, all agents know that the agent must be a good type.
Inferences following failure depend on whether or not it is believed that the agent exerted
e¤ort or not. Specically let f (n) denote the belief that the agent is good given one failure
when it is believed that the agent exerted no e¤ort; ff (e; n) for the belief that the agent
is good given two observed failures when it is believed that the agent exerted e¤ort in the
rst period but not in the second; other beliefs are denoted similarly and can be written
explicitly as follows
f (n) = (1 g)(1 g)+1  =
(1 g)
1 g
f (e) = (1 g e)1 g e
ff (n; n) = (1 g)
2
(1 g)2+1 
ff (e; n) = ff (n; e) = (1 g)(1 g e)(1 g)(1 g e)+1 
ff (e; e) = (1 g e)
2
(1 g e)2+1 
In addition, suppose there is an outside option R which can be invoked in any period.
First, we characterize conditions which ensure that when working alone an agent would
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exert e¤ort in the rst period but not in the second and would stay in the industry following
a rst period success but leave it otherwise.
First the condition that ensures that she would stay following success in the rst period
is:
g  R. (45)
A condition which ensures that the she would leave the industry following two failures
is that:
R  ff (n; n)g. (46)
Note that ff (n; n) > ff (n; e) = ff (e; n)  ff (e; e) and so (46) is su¢ cient to
ensure that the agent leaves the industry following two failures whatever the beliefs about
her having exerted e¤ort in the past.
Conditions which ensure that the agent leaves the industry following one failure and
claims the outside option whether exerting e¤ort or not are given respectively by:37
2R  f (n)(g + e)(1 + g)  c+ (1  f (n)(g + e))R, and (47)
2R  f (n)g + f (n)g2 + (1  f (n)g)R. (48)
The condition which ensures that the agent prefers to stay in the industry and exert
e¤ort in the rst period to leaving the industry immediately is
(g + e)(1 + 2g)  c+ (1  (g + e))2R  3R. (49)
Finally the condition that states that she prefers to stay in the industry and exert e¤ort
in the rst period to deviating and not exerting e¤ort (even though e¤ort is anticipated)
is as follows:
(g + e)(1 + 2g)  c+ (1  (g + e))2R > (g + e) + 2g2 + (1  g)2R (50)
Thus inequalities (46)-(50) characterize parameters for which it is a PBE that an agent
37Note that since f (n) > f (e) and g > R these conditions (which state that following one failure the
agent leaves the industry given that she knows that she exerted no e¤ort in the rst period), it follows that
the conditions also ensure that the agent leaves the industry following a failure when it she exerted e¤ort
in the rst period.
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Figure 7: Finite model: equilibrium path behaviour
exerts e¤ort in the rst period of life and then stays in the industry following a success and
leaves the industry following a failure.
Now suppose that the agent in the second period of her life has the opportunity to hire
a new born agent though this agent cannot then go on to hire her own agent and show
that this can be an equilibrium. The possible outcomes in this situation are summarized
in the gure below.
An agent who works alone throughout life, supposing inequalities (46)-(50) hold, would
earn
S = (g + e)(1 + 2g)  c+ (1  (g + e))2R. (51)
Following a rst period success the continuation value when working alone is 2g. The
continuation value if hiring with the contract (w1; w2) is instead
H = 2g+ e  c+ (g+ e) w1+ (g+ e)2(g+ e w2). Thus the senior will hire in her
second period following success so long as
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2g + e  c+ (g + e)  w1 + (g + e)2(g + e  w2)  2g (52)
She will not deviate by not exerting e¤ort so long as the continuation value by hiring
and exerting e¤ort H is greater than the value by deviating and not exerting e¤ort which
is 2g + e+ (g + e)  w1 + (g + e)g(g + e  w2). Thus the senior will not deviate by not
exerting e¤ort so long as this value is less than or equal to H, or equivalently:
e(g + e  w2)(g + e)  c: (53)
She behaves honestly in retaining a junior following two success so long as:
g  w2. (54)
Finally the junior agent must be willing to be hired and to exert e¤ort, and stay
following a success. This leads to three further conditions, specically the value of being
hired should be no less than the value to working alone:
w1   c+ (g + e)2(w2 + g) + (1  (g + e)2)R  S, (55)
and the junior should be willing to exert e¤ort in the rst period of her life (corre-
sponding to period 2 of the time path) so that the left hand side of (55) must be greater
than or equal to w1 + (g + e)g(w2 + g) + (1  (g + e)g)R, or equivalently
(g + e)e(w2 + g  R)  c. (56)
The last condition is that following a success, the junior should prefer to stay in the
rm to leaving the rm (and so also the industry) that is:
w2 + g  2R (57)
Finally, having characterized the relevant inequalities, it remains to show that there
are indeed parameter values for which all the relevant inequalities hold. It can be easily
veried that (46)-(50) and (52)-(57) are all satised, for example, when R = 0:6, g = 0:5,
e = 0:3, c = 0:01,  = 0:8, w1 = 1, and w2 = 0:55.
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D g < 1 and b > 0 age non observable
Again, as in Section 3, we suppose that agents do not know their own types at birth but,
in contrast to the framework considered in Section 3, it is supposed that g < 1 and b > 0.
We characterize conditions for an up-or-out e¤ort inducing equilibrium in which both new
born agents and successful agents in the second period of life exert e¤ort. The equilibrium
follows the structure characterized in Section 3 but in which agents who fail (either on their
own or as part of a rm that su¤ered at least one failure) pose as new born agents, are
willing to work as juniors when given the opportunity and exert no e¤ort. For convenience,
take b = 0.
The value of a new born who starts life working alone is given by:
HVsolo = g   c+ g(g + g   c  w1 + g2(g + g   wm2 )) + (1  g)g. (58)
Note that this expression is built up as follows. On observing an agent who appears to
be new-born working alone, customers believe that she is a competent new born agent with
probability , we characterize  below but note that  <  since among the pool of those
agents who appear to be new born there will be some second-period agents who are hiding
their histories. The new born agent, who exerts e¤ort and knows that she is new born
expects success with probability g and in this case she hires a another agent as a junior
(note that this may be a failed agent pretending to be new born and so the probability
that junior will be new born and competent is g) and so can charge g + g for the joint
service and in case of further success she promotes the junior, paying her the managers fee
and receiving the appropriate revenue.38 Following a failure in the rst period, the agent
can pose as a new-born agent and so receive the revenue g.
The value for a new born agent who works as an employee is given by the following
expression:
HVjoint = w1   c+ g2(wm2   c  w1 + g2(g + g   wm2 )) + (1  g2)g. (59)
As before we impose:
38 If there are two successes and the junior was a failed agent, she can not claim the promotion, but retires.
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HVsolo = HVjoint (60)
In addition to the conditions which are similar to those considered in Proposition 2.
There will be new conditions to sustain an equilibrium, in particular, that a second period
agent who is hiding her history prefers to work alone rather than be hired as a junior.
Specically, this condition is given by:
w1  g (61)
Say that there is a stable proportion of agents  in each generation who succeed in the
rst period of life hire new-borns is given by . Then  = 2  and  = g(2 2)+g2,
so  = 2 g(2  2) +  2 g2. First note that 
2g4   42g3   4g2 + 42g2 + 4 = 4(1  g2) + 42g2(1  g) + 2g4 > 0
Secondly note that there is a sensible solution only when 0    1.
Write f() = g2+(2 2)g (2 ). Then f(0) = 2g > 0 and f(1) = g2 1 < 0
so there must be at least one solution for the quadratic equation f() = 0 in the range,
the question is, is there exactly one and which one?
Well consider
g(1  g2) + 1 + 12
q 
2g4   42g3   4g2 + 42g2 + 4
This is > 1 so the root in the range (0; 1) must be the negative root. That is the
equation has exactly one root in the range [0; 1] and so
 = 1 + g   1
2
g2   1
2
q 
4  4g2 + 42g2   42g3 + 2g4.
Corresponding to Proposition 11, the remaining constraints can be categorized in groups
as follows.
(i) work alone
Now there is no opportunity to leave the industry, but an agent can always choose to
work alone in both periods. It must be the case that pursuing the hypothesized up-or-out
equilibrium strategies from birth is preferred to working alone:
Vsolo  2g (62)
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and Vjoint  2g. Note that (60) makes this latter condition redundant.
(ii) exert e¤ort (incentive compatibility)
For a second period agent who had been successful there is an incentive compatibility
constraint which is identical in both the case that she worked alone in the rst period
and the case when she is now a manager specically, this constraint is as follows:
g + g   wm2  
c
g2
 0 . (63)
In the rst period in both cases, that the agent works alone or as a junior, it must be
worthwhile to exert e¤ort. The corresponding incentive compatibility conditions are the
following:
g   c  w1 + g2(g + g   wm2 ) 
c
g
 0, (64)
and
wm2   c  w1 + g2(g + g   wm2 )  g  
c
g2
 0 . (65)
(iii) hiring policy
Without hiring in the second period of life, the agent could not commit to e¤ort and
so the conditions that a second period agent who had success when working alone in the
rst period does indeed prefer to hire a junior is given by:
g   c  w1 + g2(g + g   wm2 )  0
which is implied by (64). Similarly the corresponding condition that a manager prefers
to hire is implied by (65).
Suppose that an agent failed in the rst period of life, imposing the o¤-equilibrium
belief that if she were to hire she would exert no e¤ort, then a su¢ cient condition that
would ensure that she does not hire is given by:
0   w1 + g(g + g   wm2 ). (66)
Note that in this case, since b = 0, a single success demonstrates to customers that the
junior must be competent.
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Finally, the condition that a new born agent prefers not to hire is given by:
HVsolo  g+g w1 c+g2[g+g c w1+g+g wm2 +g2(g+g wm2 )]+(1 g2)g .
(67)
In this last expression we suppose that the new born agent exerts e¤ort and that
following one success the updated belief is relatively small so that an agent with such a
reputation would prefer to hide her history and pose as a new born.
(iv) Promotion policy
First, a senior honest, that is she must prefer to promote to manager a junior who had
been successful. This conditions is given by:
g + g   wm2  0 . (68)
In addition for the equilibrium characterized a senior in a rm with either one or
two failures should not want to promote. This might be the case for example if the o¤-
equilibrium beliefs in this case were that the promoted senior would exert no e¤ort then
the relevant condition no promotion condition would be:
0   wm2 + g (69)
Verication
It can readily be veried that all the relevant conditions are satised when  = g = 0:9,
c = 0:05, w1 = 0:74 and wm2 = 1:454.
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